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DECEDENTS' ESTATES-WILLS-DOCTRINE OF DEPENDENT
RELATIVE REVOCATION-MAY NOT BE APPLICABLE IN ARKANSAS.
Larrick v. Larrick, 271 Ark. 120, 607 S.W.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1980).
Woodrow Larrick died June 27, 1979. His wife Verna con-
tended that he had died intestate, while his brother, Arthur, urged
that a 1978 will be admitted to probate. Arthur testified that the
1978 will provided him a devise of $30,000 with Verna to get the rest
of the estate.I One witness testified that Woodrow had asked him
how to effectively destroy his will. Another testified to hearing
Woodrow say, the day before he died, that he had torn up his will
and had to "get one made out."2 He added that Woodrow at one
time had said that his brothers "had all they needed." Verna testi-
fied that her husband intended to make a new will quite a bit differ-
ent from the destroyed one, but died suddenly before doing so. 3 She
testified that he tore and burned the 1978 will because of conversa-
tions with his family which indicated that were he to die Verna
would get nothing.4
The Cleburne County Probate Court found that Woodrow had
destroyed the 1978 will with the intention of making a new one.
The court then applied the doctrine of dependent relative revocation
and admitted the 1978 will to probate.5
On appeal Verna Larrick argued that the lower court had erred
in applying the doctrine of dependent relative revocation since the
doctrine was not law in Arkansas. In the alternative, she urged that
there was not sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that
Woodrow intended to revoke the will in question.6
The Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the de-
cision of the probate court, finding that the deceased's will had been
revoked and that he therefore died intestate.7 The court left a strong
implication that in Arkansas, application of the doctrine of depen-
dent relative revocation may be precluded by existing Arkansas stat-
1. Larrick v. Larrick, 271 Ark. 120, 123, 607 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ct. App. 1980).
2. Id. at 121, 607 S.W.2d at 93.
3. Id. at 121-22, 607 S.W.2d at 93.
4. Id. at 124, 607 S.W.2d at 94.
5. Id. at 121, 607 S.W.2d at 93.
6. Brief for Appellant at 79.
7. Larrick v. Larrick, 271 Ark. 120, 126, 607 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Ct. App. 1980).
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utory law. Larrick v. Larrick, 271 Ark. 120, 607 S.W.2d 92 (Ct.
App. 1980).
Under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, also
known as conditional or provisional revocation,8 a revocation is not
effective if a testator revokes a will with a present intention to make
a new disposition as a substitute, and the new disposition is either
not made or is ineffective. 9 The doctrine is mainly a fiction which
the courts may employ to deny an apparent revocation upon the
feigned ground that the revocation was conditional.'" The origin of
the doctrine is not clear, although its principles were recognized at
least as early as 1587.11 The doctrine in its present form was applied
in the most celebrated' 2 of the early cases, Onions v. Tyrer, 13 which
held that an insufficiently executed will did not operate to revoke an
earlier will. The phrase dependent relative revocation was coined in
1788,' 4 and the law had become fairly well crystallized in England
by the start of the 19th century.'5
The doctrine is one of postulated intent and is utilized to fur-
ther the supposed wishes of the deceased.' 6 It is based upon the
premise that the courts (and presumably the deceased) prefer testacy
over intestacy. 7 When it is obvious that the deceased intended
otherwise, the doctrine will not be applied.'8
When the testator destroys his will with a view toward making
a new one, but then fails to do so, the courts must determine
whether there was an intent to revoke absolutely or whether the tes-
8. 79 AM. JUR. 2d Wills § 563 (1975).
9. 95 C.J.S. Wills § 267 (1957).
10. T. ATKINSON, ATKINSON ON WILLS § 88, at 454 (2d ed. 1953).
11. French's Case, Rolle's Abr., Dev.(O) 4 (c. 1587). In that case it was held that an
ineffective devise could not operate to pass lands but could operate to revoke a prior devise
of the same lands. The report gives none of the surrounding facts.
12. Warren, Dependent Relative Revocation, 33 HARV. L. REV. 337, 343 (1920).
13. 23 Eng. Rep. 1085 (1716). The testator destroyed his first will in the belief that a
second instrument was valid. The second instrument, in fact, was not valid because it had
not been witnessed in the testator's presence. The court refused to treat the destruction of
the first will as a revocation.
14. Warren, supra note 12, at 337.
15. Cornish, Dependent Relative Revocation, 5 So. CAL. L. REV. 273, 277 (1932).
16. In re Pratt's Estate, 88 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1956); Watson v. Landvatter, 517 S.W.2d 117
(Mo. 1974).
17. Starnes v. Andre, 243 Ark. 712, 421 S.W.2d 616 (1967); Gibbons v. Ward, 115 Ark.
184, 171 S.W. 90 (1914); Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Coles, 150 Conn. 569, 192 A.2d
202 (1963).
18. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 477 F.2d 319 (8th Cir. 1973); La Croix
v. Senecal, 140 Conn. 311, 99 A.2d 115 (1953).
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tator would prefer the old will to intestacy.' 9 Perhaps this is the only
instance under dependent relative revocation when the testator has a
truly conditional state of mind; that is, when the testator intends for
revocation to be effective only upon the execution of a valid new
will.2°
Far more frequent are the cases where the testator is mistaken
about some fact or point of law.2' In such situations the doctrine
may manifest itself in a number of ways. The testator may revoke a
will in the mistaken belief that devisees or legatees are no longer
alive.22 Or, he may revoke a previous will and execute a new docu-
ment making provision for some unknown or unidentifiable person,
such as in John Hancock Mutual Lfe Insurance Co. v. Jackson .u3 In
that case the deceased had revoked a former disposition and named
his wife as beneficiary, when in fact he had never been married. It
was impossible to determine who he intended as beneficiary. The
court applied the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, con-
cluding that had the deceased known his intended disposition would
be inoperative, he would have preferred the prior beneficiary
designation to be given effect.24 Another mistake of fact situation
occurs when the testator destroys his will without realizing what he
is destroying.25 Although these are really mistakes, and there is no
conditional frame of mind on the part of the person mistaken, the
fiction of dependent relative revocation is often used to infer that if
the testator had known the true nature of the situation, he would not
have revoked his will.26 Hence, the revocation is treated as depen-
dent upon the facts being as the testator perceived them and is
otherwise void. 7
The doctrine is also applied where the testator is mistaken
about the applicable law.28 The testator may revoke a will in the
belief that a previous will is revived2 9 or that all of his estate will go
19. Briscoe v. Allison, 200 Tenn. 115, 290 S.W.2d 864 (1956); In re Estate of Hall, 7
Wash. App. 341, 499 P.2d 912 (1972).
20. ATKINSON, supra note 10, § 88, at 453.
21. Id.
22. Eg., In re Mucklow's Will, 242 App. Div. 111, 272 N.Y.S. 776 (1934).
23. 477 F.2d 319 (8th Cir. 1973).
24. Id. at 323.
25. E.g., In re Spencer, 77 Conn. 638, 60 A. 289 (1905).
26. 2 PAGE ON WILLS § 21.57, at 447-48 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1960).
27. Id.
28. Eg., Flanders v. White, 142 Or. 375, 18 P.2d 823 (1933).
29. Eg., In re McCaffrey's Estate, 174 Misc. 162, 20 N.Y.S. 2d 178 (Sur. Ct. 1940).
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to a spouse or some other family member." He may attempt to
revoke a previous will in a subsequent will that has no legal effect.31
In such a case the efficacy of the intended revocation must be deter-
mined by the deceased's intent. 2
Frequently cases arise where the testator deletes or changes
portions of an existing will without properly reexecuting it, as in
Oliver v. Union National Bank of Springield33 and Woodson v.
Woodson .34 In both instances the testator or testatrix made hand-
written changes to a valid will but failed to have the alterations at-
tested. The courts in both cases applied the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation, holding that the wills as originally written re-
mained operative. In such cases the court must determine the intent
of the testator and decide whether he would prefer the old provi-
sions of the will or partial intestacy.35
Although the doctrine of dependent relative revocation has
never been applied in Arkansas, 36 two supreme court cases have
mentioned it. The question in Starnes v. Andre37 was whether the
writing of the word "void" at the top of the pages of a will along
with making slash marks across the pages were valid attempts to
revoke the will. The court stated that it could find no facts to justify
application of the doctrine in that case, 8 finding instead that the
testatrix made the marks with the intention to revoke the will abso-
lutely.39
The court reached a similar conclusion in Armstrong v. Butler.40
In that case, the testatrix made no mention of several grandchildren
in a 1970 will although in her 1967 will she had specifically disinher-
ited them. The plaintiff sought to avail herself of the doctrine of
dependent relative revocation, hoping to convince the court that
since the 1970 will did not express the intent of the testatrix, its revo-
30. See 39 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1926).
31. In re Anthony's Estate, 265 Minn. 382, 121 N.W.2d 772 (1963).
32. See generally cases cited note 17 supra.
33. 504 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
34. 363 Mo. 978, 255 S.W.2d 771 (1953).
35. For example, if the original will contained a legacy of $1000, and the testator had
marked through the figure and written $800 above it, the court would probably construe the
testator's intent as desiring the original term; whereas, if the change had been to $10, the
court would probably presume that the testator preferred intestacy as to that portion of the
will, rather than to give effect to the original amount.
36. Larrick v. Larrick, 271 Ark. 120, 125, 607 S.W.2d 92, 95 (Ct. App. 1980).
37. 243 Ark. 712, 421 S.W.2d 616 (1967).
38. Id. at 720, 421 S.W.2d at 621.
39. Id. at 717, 421 S.W.2d at 619.
40. 262 Ark. 31, 553 S.W.2d 453 (1977).
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cation clause should be void and the 1967 will should be given ef-
fect. The court was unable to find facts to justify application of the
doctrine.4'
One other Arkansas case must be mentioned when discussing
the utility of the doctrine in Arkansas. In Parker v. Mobley 42 the
plaintiffs tried to revive a 1973 will that had been expressly revoked
by a 1976 testamentary document. The latter will had been de-
stroyed at the direction of the testator. Although the case did not
mention conditional revocation, the court held that no will which
has been revoked may be revived other than in accordance with
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-408 (1971),43 which requires that a revoked
will can only be revived by reexecuting it. Since there had been no
reexecution of the 1973 will, the court found that the deceased died
intestate. 44
In Wa/pole v. Lewis45 the Arkansas Supreme Court cited with
apparent approval the following passage:
Where a testator obliterates, deletes, or cancels a will, having a
present intent to make a new will, as a substitute for the old, and
the new will is not made, it is presumed that the testator preferred
the old will to intestacy and effect will be given the old will. 46
While the term dependent relative revocation was not expressly
used, the language evinces the essence of the doctrine.
The Larrick court sought to answer three questions: who had
removed the will from Woodrow's safety lock box and destroyed it;
was the doctrine of dependent relative revocation applicable in Ar-
kansas; and, if so, would the doctrine apply in this case?47
The question of who had destroyed the will was of paramount
importance because if Woodrow had not performed or directed the
performance of the destructive act, no revocation had occurred. 8
The court noted that one method of revoking one's will under Ar-
kansas law is to physically destroy it "with the intent and for the
41. Id. at 40, 553 S.W.2d at 458.
42. 264 Ark. 805, 577 S.W.2d 583 (1979).
43. Id. at 809, 577 S.W.2d at 585. Section 60-408 provides in pertinent part: "No will
or any part thereof which shall be revoked. . . can be revived otherwise than by a reexecu-
tion thereof, or by the execution of another will in which the revoked. . . will . . is incor-
porated by reference."
44. Parker v. Mobley, 264 Ark. 805, 809-A, 577 S.W.2d 583, 586 (1979).
45. 254 Ark. 89, 492 S.W.2d 410 (1973).
46. Id. at 97, 492 S.W.2d at 415 (citing 95 C.J.S. Wills § 385 (1957)).
47. Larrick v. Larrick, 271 Ark. 120, 607 S.W.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1980).
48. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-406 (197 1).
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purpose of revoking the same. . . -49 Although the court left un-
resolved the question of who had removed the will from the lock
box,5" based upon the statements of Verna Larrick and another wit-
ness it was determined that there was "substantial evidence" to sup-
port a finding of fact that it was Woodrow Larrick who had
destroyed the will.5
Having determined this, the court set out to determine the ap-
plicability of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation in Ar-
kansas. Upon defining the doctrine and recognizing its
subordination to the intent of the testator, the court traced the sparse
history of the doctrine in Arkansas. After finding that it had been
mentioned infrequently and had never been applied to any known
case,5 2 the court turned to a consideration of ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-
408 (1971).53 Section 60-408 states that a revoked will can be re-
vived only by reexecution or by incorporation in another will. The
court said that "this statute would seem to preclude the application
of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation here in Arkansas.
5 4
While agreeing with the probate court's findings of fact, the
court of appeals disagreed with its application of the law.5 In re-
versing the lower court's decision, the court based its reasoning
upon a determination that Woodrow Larrick had conclusively re-
voked his will.5 6 Even though there was some evidence that he in-
tended to make a new will, 57 the court, borrowing language from
Parker v. Mobley, stated that "[ejveryone is presumed to possess
knowledge of the legal consequences of his acts or omissions."58
Further, the court added that if the decedent had wished to reinstate
his will, he could have easily reexecuted it.5 9 Since the "presump-
tion Woodrow Larrick intended to revoke his will has not been
overcome nor rebutted, '60 the court determined that Larrick had
49. Larrick v. Larrick, 271 Ark. 120, 123, 607 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ct. App. 1980) (quoting
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-406 (1971)).
50. There was confusing and contradictory testimony on this point. The evidence
seemed to indicate that Verna had removed the will although she was not authorized to do
SO.
51. Larrick v. Larrick, 271 Ark. 120, 124, 607 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ct. App. 1980).
52. Id. at 125, 607 S.W.2d at 95.
53. Id.
54. 271 Ark. 120, 125-26, 607 S.W.2d 92, 95 (Ct. App. 1980).
55. Id. at 126, 607 S.W.2d at 95.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 121, 607 S.W.2d at 93.
58. Id. at 126, 607 S.W.2d at 95.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 126, 607 S.W.2d at 96.
died intestate.6' In addition to stating that Arkansas law seems to
preclude application of the doctrine of dependent relative revoca-
tion, the court held that the doctrine could not be applied to the
facts at hand.62 Accordingly, the court held that the admission of
the revoked will to probate was error.63
Judge Newburn concurred with the final outcome of the case
but was unwilling to go so far as to declare that ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-408 (1971) precludes the application of dependent relative rev-
ocation in Arkansas.64 He noted that the statute applies only when
there has been a revocation, and the doctrine is used precisely for
the purpose of determining whether or not a revocation has oc-
curred.65
Hence, it appears that the doctrine of dependent relative revo-
cation currently has no place in Arkansas law. Although the court
held that the doctrine could not be applied to the particular facts at
hand, it seems apparent that should the requisite facts present them-
selves, the court would feel compelled to reject the doctrine in view
of ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-408 (1971).
Arkansas courts have consistently expressed a preference for
finding testacy rather than intestacy,66 and, where possible, will con-
strue the facts to find that a deceased has died testate.67 It would be
unwise for the Arkansas courts to totally reject dependent relative
revocation as a viable doctrine in this state. Ostensibly the courts
would prefer to retain as many alternatives to intestacy as possible.
Since the Arkansas Supreme Court has cited with approval the very
essence of the doctrine, the better view is that section 60-408 should
not preclude application of dependent relative revocation in Arkan-
sas.
The court should have held that the doctrine of dependent rela-
tive revocation was not applicable to the facts in Larrick, and then
indicated a recognition and perhaps an acceptance of the doctrine in




64. Id. at 127, 607 S.W.2d at 96.
65. Id.
66. Eg., Gibbons v. Ward, 115 Ark. 184, 171 S.W. 90 (1914).
67. Id. at 192, 171 S.W. at 92.
68. The outcome of the case is probably correct. Since dependent relative revocation is
an intent supplementing doctrine, it will only be applied where it can further the intent of
the deceased. The court found that Woodrow destroyed his will with the intention of revok-
ing it absolutely. They could have found that, in the absence of a new will, he would have
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tion of the doctrine. The court in Larrick failed to recognize a basic
tenet of dependent relative revocation which presumes that the tes-
tator does not intend to revoke a previous will until the new will or
intended new will becomes effective. In other words, if the revoca-
tion is subject to a condition which is not fulfilled, the revocation
never takes place. 69 Section 60-408 only applies to revoked wills,
while dependent relative revocation presumes that the first will was
never revoked. The doctrine and the statute are therefore compati-
ble.
Grisham Phillps
preferred intestacy over the terms of the old will. The court received evidence which indi-
cated that Woodrow intended to make substantial changes in his will to the effect that Verna
was to get everything and his brothers nothing. Brief for Appellant at 80. Under Arkansas
law this is exactly what would happen if he were to die intestate. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-
149, -206 (1971). It was proper under these facts, therefore, not to apply the doctrine of
dependent relative revocation because the intent of the deceased was best furthered by not
doing so.
69. 95 C.J.S. Wills § 267 (1957).
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